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INTRODUCTION
“The patent bargain is the foundation upon which the patent system is built:
in exchange for protections for an invention, the inventor agrees to make public
their inventions so that others may build upon it.”1 The patent bargain creates
a presumption of protection for the inventors, yet categorizing the patent a
public right or a private right has diminished expectations for inventors and
confusion for the masses. On October 11, 2016, the Supreme Court denied two
petitions for writ of certiorari that challenged the constitutionality of Patent
Trial and Review Board proceedings on the basis of the patent owner’s Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial and Article III separation of powers.2 The latter
of those cases is the cornerstone for which this comment rests. In Cooper v.
Lee,3 Petitioner J. Carl Cooper asked the United States Supreme Court to review
a section of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act that established “inter partes
review,” (IPR) a procedure for administrative review of a patent.4 Making a
number of constitutional challenges, Cooper asserts that inter partes review
empowers an executive agency tribunal to assert judicial power cancelling a
private property right.5 Moreover, Cooper stresses that patent disputes among
private parties are disputes that have been known in the common law courts of
1789, afforded a trial, and cannot be adjudicated by an advisory opinion.6 After
a tumultuous trip through the legal system in an attempt to finally determine
the constitutionality of the IPR system, the high court has again left us
pondering the issue of patent adjudication. With its denial of the petitioner’s
writ for certiorari, the Court has again refused to declare whether patent rights
are a private or public right. What does this mean for patent owners going
forward? The waters are murky, but we will continue to see the adjudication of
patent disputes by a non-Article III tribunal.
This Comment examines a key question for patent administrative law:
whether the grant of a patent is a public right, (i.e. a right that is primarily a
concern of the public and can only be conferred by the government) thus subject
to revocation by an administrative agency? In analyzing this concern, this

1. Editorial. The patent bargain. NATURE (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.nature.com/news/thepatent-bargain-1.14333 [https://perma.cc/UTQ3-4DVD].
2. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari. MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 151330, 2016 WL 1729988 (Apr. 29, 2016), cert. denied, 2016 WL 1724103 (Oct. 11, 2016) (arguing
cancellation of patent claims violated Seventh Amendment right to jury trial); Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, Cooper v. Lee, No. 15-955, 2016 WL 355184 (Jan. 21, 2016), cert. denied, 2016 WL
361681 (Oct. 11, 2016) (arguing violation of Separation of Powers).
3. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Cooper v. Lee, supra note 2.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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Comment will address three subjects. First, this Comment will explore how
section 311 of the Patent Act7 established the process of inter-partes
proceedings and section 3218 established the post-grant review of patents.
Second, this Comment will outline the case law challenging the
constitutionality of section 311 and section 321.9 Third, this Comment will
examine the competing perspectives of whether a patent is a public or private
right. This Comment has important implications for whether section 311 and
section 321 are constitutional exercises of congressional power. Finally, this
Comment will attempt to foreshadow how the outcome of current case law will
affect the patent bargain and adjudication scheme.
I. INTER PARTES AND POST-GRANT PROCEEDINGS: NEW ADMINISTRATIVE
INNOVATION IN PATENT LAW
Examination remains the crucial element of the quid pro quo patent
bargain.10 The federal government’s patent power stems from a specific
constitutional provision, which authorizes Congress “[t]o promote the
[p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes to
authors and [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their respective [w]ritings and
[d]iscoveries.”11 This clause provides inventors who obtain patents a great deal
of power, while simultaneously creating limitations to those who are denied
patentability.12 As a member of the patent board for several years, Thomas
Jefferson recognized the difficulty in “drawing a line between the things which
are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those of
which are not.”13 “Jefferson, like other Americans, had an instinctive aversion
to monopolies” and his theory of patent ownerships was based on the economic
concerns of promoting technological advances rather than protecting inventors’
moral rights to their discoveries.14 The inherent problems of the patent bargain
inspired the development of statutory provisions that would weed out
inventions that were not worthy of the exclusive right of patentability, while
outweighing the restrictive effect of the patent monopoly.15 As such, any
inventor who wishes to obtain a patent on a particular invention or claimed form
of art must first file an application with the United States Patent and Trademark
7. 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012), amended by Pub. L. 112-274, §1(d)(2) (2013).
8. Id.
9. See supra note 2.
10. See generally Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
11. U.S CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
12. Graham, 383 U.S. at 4–5.
13. Id. at 9.
14. Id. at 7–9.
15. Id. at 10–11.
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Office (USPTO), that contains a specific oath by the applicant that they are the
true creator of the invention at bar.16 A USPTO examiner will then review the
application and determine whether the claims present in the application are
patentable.17 If the applicant meets the statutory requirements, the USPTO will
issue a patent to the inventor.18 However, controversy arises to the question of
whether a patent can be reviewed after issuance of a decision by the USPTO.19
Administrative review of the issuance of patents can be separated by two
significant time periods: The Patent Act of 1952, and the America Invents Act
of 2011 (AIA).20 The two periods are commonly known as Pre-AIA and PostAIA.
A. Pre-AIA: Administrative Review under the Patent Act of 1952
Before 1980, a party could only challenge the validity of an issued patent
through the courts in jury trials.21 In 1980, Congress enacted the first statute
which allowed for an administrative alternative to federal court litigation for
patent issuance disputes known as “ex parte reexamination.”22 Section 302 of
the Patent Act authorized an ex parte reexamination in which a patent owner or
third party could request that the USPTO reexamine that patentability of an
issued patent.23 Upon granting a petition for ex parte review, the USPTO would
reexamine the question of patentability and issue a final office action that could
lead to reexamination of an issued patent.24 Ex parte reexamination was limited
as only the patent owner could seek administrative appellate review of any
rejection by the USPTO.25 In a review of this procedure, Congress determined
that ex parte reexamination was inadequate because it failed to allow third party
requestors to participate in the review process.26
Beyond its practical infirmities, Section 302 of the Patent Act of 1952 was

16. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111(a), 115 (2012).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See generally Robert P. Greenspoon, SCOTUS asked to consider constitutional
challenges to post grant proceedings, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2016/01/21/scotus-asked-consider-constitutional-challenge-post-grant-patent-proceedings/id=65129/.
20. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
21. See Patlex v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 601 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
22. See Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C.
ch. 30).
23. See 35 U.S.C. § 302; see also Syntex (USA), Inc. v. USPTO, 882 F.2d 1570, 1573 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) (outlining the basic contours of the ex parte reexamination statute that gave third-party
requestors no right to participate in the reexamination process).
24. 35 U.S.C. § 305.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 306(b) (2012).
26. Patlex, 758 F.2d at 601.
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also challenged on constitutional grounds. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) considered whether the ex parte
reexamination procedure was constitutional in two key cases: Patlex v.
Mossinghoff and Joy Technologies, Inc. v. ManBeck.27 First, in Patlex, a 1985
case, the Federal Circuit examined how vested property or other interests are
protected by the Fifth Amendment, the Seventh Amendment, or Article III,
against the retrospective effect of patent reexamination. “If so, did the
provisions of Public Law 96–517 or any of its implementing regulations effect
a deprivation of protected interests?”28 Under 35 U.S.C. § 261, which provides
that “[s]ubject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of
personal property,”29 appellants argued that the section must be interpreted to
mean that the inventor’s bundle of rights following the issuance of a patent are
protected with the same constitutional muster as tangible property rights.30 “It
is beyond reasonable debate that patents are property.”31 As such, the appellant
asserted that he “has been deprived of the right to have validity determined by
a jury and an Article III court, both of which rights are founded in the
Constitution.”32 The Federal Circuit was not persuaded by the appellants’
arguments and upheld the constitutionality of ex parte reexamination by the
USPTO.33 Specifically, the Federal Circuit did not read McCormick
Harvesting as forbidding Congress from authorizing reexamination to correct
governmental mistakes, even against the will of the patent owner.34 Even so,
the court again failed to determine the extent of Congress’s reexamination
authority and how that impacts the protections afforded to inventors. So,
litigation continued.
In Joy Technologies, Inc. v. ManBeck, the Federal Circuit once again
considered whether or not ex parte reexamination proceedings violate the
Seventh Amendment or Article III of the Constitution.35 The petitioner in Joy
requested that the court of appeals “review the district court’s conclusion that

27. See generally Patlex, 758 F.2d 594; Joy Techs., Inc. v. ManBeck, 959 F.2d 226 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
28. Patlex, 758 F.2d at 598–599; see In Consol. Fruit Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876)
(“A patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land. The right rests on the same
foundation and is surrounded and protected by the same sanctions.”).
29. 35 U.S.C. § 261.
30. Patlex, 758 F.2d at 600.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 603.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 604 (holding “[v]alidity often is brought into question in disputes between private
parties, but the threshold question usually is whether the PTO, under the authority assigned to it by
Congress, properly granted the patent.”).
35. See Joy Techs., 959 F.2d at 226.
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the reexamination statute does not unconstitutionally deprive a patentee of a
jury trial and the court’s imposition of costs against Joy pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
§ 145.”36 Joy further questioned the vitality of the Patlex ruling.37 Rejecting
the petitioner’s arguments and relying heavily on the ruling in Patlex, the court
of appeals held that that the ex parte reexamination proceedings do not violate
the Seventh Amendment or Article III of the Constitution.38 “Together, Patlex
and Joy settled the question of whether the PTO can adjudicate the validity of
issued patents for a generation.”39 Yet, thirty years later, the Court has been
asked again to consider whether administrative tribunals reviewing the validity
of issued patents violates the patentee’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial. And again, they have failed to provide insight.
B. Post-AIA Administrative Review – Inter Partes Review
and Post-Grant Review
In 2011, Congress passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.40 The Act
asserted the USPTO’s administrative authority which had been limited under
the 1952 Act. These limitations were a result of the Federal Circuit assuming
exclusive responsibility for making substantive interpretations of the Patent Act
and “historically cho[osing] not to defer to agencies on the issues of patent
law.”41 However, the USPTO pushed back; this push for agency rulemaking
authority played a fundamental role in the reforms of the AIA. 42 One
commenter refers to the historical shift in substantive rulemaking authority as
the “power struggle” between the Federal Circuit and the USPTO.43 Pre-AIA,
the substantive restrictions on the USPTO’s rulemaking authority stemmed
from the courts’ patriarchal mentality. Yet, ultimately the USPTO won the
struggle for rule-making authority with the enactment of the AIA. 44 The AIA
not only addressed the rulemaking authority of the agencies, but also addressed
the fundamental deficiencies in the patent system, the delays in the review

36. Id. at 227.
37. “Joy contends that ‘[t]he Seventh Amendment analysis requirements established in
Granfinanciera v. Nordberg and Tull v. United States raise serious doubt about the present vitality of
Patlex.’” Id. at 228 (citations omitted).
38. Id. at 228–229.
39. Daniel C. Cooley, J. Derek McCorquindale & Jason L. Romrell, The Constitutional
Argument Against Agency Adjudication: Can the PTAB invalidate an issued Patent? 89 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 2203, at 1305 (March 13, 2015).
40. H.R. REP. No. 1249 (2011).
41. Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1550 (2011).
42. Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH 609, 616–17 (2012).
43. Id.
44. Id.
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process and the inconsistent quality of patents issued.45 Prior to its enactment,
the culmination of frustrations with the patent system under the 1954 act
prompted two professors to assert in 2009 that “[t]he patent system is in
crisis.”46
In an attempt to correct the crisis, the AIA contained a slew of reforms,
most significantly diverting patent validity into an administrative agency
tribunal after the issuance of the patent.47 After establishing the Patent Trial
and Appeal Board (PTAB), Congress further expanded the tools for reviewing
validity with the establishment of inter partes review (IPR) and post-grant
proceedings.48 Now, an individual or entity may only petition for inter partes
review under section 311.49 By giving the USPTO and the PTAB broad control
over their new “trial like” proceedings, Congress shifted the substantive rulemaking authority to the agency and away from the courts.50 As can be expected,
this shift and the subsequent regulations led to even more confusion over the
scope of patent protection and extent of federal authority.
First, the creation of a post-grant review provides the USPTO the
opportunity to set substantive patent law standards and make patent policy
through its trial-like proceedings.51 Codified under 35 U.S.C. § 321, post-grant
review proceedings are conducted by the newly established PTAB, and the
USPTO proceedings are most likely to invalidate a patent.52 Still, post-grant
review allows an inventor or third party to challenge the validity of a patent to
an administrative board instead of a court.53 In Sarah Tran’s Patent Powers
article, Tran implies that the availability of post-grant proceedings may provide
a benefit to those that cannot pay the high price of patent litigation, like small
businesses and other parties with limited financial resources.54 However, the
PTAB’s broad discretion and the other policy factors that it considers in its
decision creates a standard that directly impact whether parties can retain their
fundamental patent rights.
45. Id. at 627.
46. DAN L. BURKE & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 22–29 (2009).
47. James E. Daily and F. Scott Kieff, Benefits of Patent Jury Trials for Commercializing
Innovations, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 865, 878–79 (2014) (“One reason for this is that larger firms
generally are thought to be more effective at bringing political influence to bear in agency
determination.”).
48. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–29 (2012).
49. See id. § 311(b).
50. Tran, supra note 42, at 631.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 631–32.
53. Id. at 632.
54. Id.
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The second tool given to the PTAB in regulating patent validity is the inter
partes review codified under 35 U.S.C. § 326(b). After the PTAB conducts its
inter partes review, the PTAB decides whether to institute inter partes
proceeding that is final and non-appealable.55 During the inter partes
proceeding, the patent owner and challenger is entitled to take depositions to
assist the PTAB in conducting its review.56 The inter partes review
proceedings, including the PTAB’s final written determination regarding the
validity of the challenged patent claims, must be completed within one year of
the commencement of proceedings.57 After completing the inter partes review
proceedings, as a final measure, Congress provides for appellate review in the
Federal Circuit.58
Although not the focus of this comment, the difference between the inter
partes review scheme and post grant proceedings is an important distinction.
Specifically, the standard necessary to institute an inter partes review rests on
a showing that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail
with respect to at least one of the claims challenged.”59 Whereas, the
prerequisite to institute a post-grant review requires “more likely than not that
at least one of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable,”60 or that
“the petition raises a novel or unsettled legal question that is important to other
patents or patent applications.”61 Although the parties participating in the inter
partes review have less flexibility than if they acted fast enough to avail
themselves of post grant review, both of these standards afford the USPTO
extremely broad statutory authority over standards that immensely impact the
patent rights of inventors, and alter historical patent policy.62 It seems that
between the Patent Act of 1952, and the American Invents Act of 2011, patent
rights have decreased for inventors and the barriers to agency adjudication have
increased. Although the intention of the AIA was to make the patent process
quicker and less costly for inventors, in reality, it has diminished the ability of
small businesses to challenge invalidity and it has opened a Pandora’s box of
further litigation brought by inventors who demand patent rights under the same
standard as private rights for land. Moreover, it has denounced the adjudication
55. 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012); Versata Dev. Corp. v. Rea, 959 F. Supp. 2d 912, 920 (E.D. Va.
2013).
56. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5).
57. Id. § 316(a)(11).
58. Parties who are dissatisfied with the final written decision of the PTAB may appeal the
decisions. Id. § 319 (2012).
59. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified
at 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)).
60. 35 U.S.C. § 324(a)).
61. Id.
62. Tran, supra note 42, at 635.
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under the same standards as public rights. Recently, these constitutional
challenges have recently been highlighted in several recent petitions to the
Supreme Court. The petitioners beg the Supreme Court to clarify the answer
the age-old question on our minds: is a patent right a private right or a public
right?
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW:
COOPER V. LEE AND MCM PORTFOLIO LLC V. HEWLETT-PACKARD CO.
The arguments rejected in Patlex and Joy resurfaced in recent litigation
involving constitutional challenges to administrative review in the form of post
grant and inter partes under the AIA. Confusion over the Supreme Court’s
Article III “public right” jurisprudence has reached its apex in two cases
pending on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. The first, Cooper v. Lee,63
raises constitutional challenges to the new post-grant proceedings available to
PTAB under the AIA.64 The second, MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard
Co.,65 similarly raises the constitutional challenge to the inter partes review
under Article III and the Seventh Amendment.66 The constitutional challenges
to the new IPR and post-grant proceedings are not new to the Supreme Court.
Although the AIA initiated these proceedings in 2011, the real threshold issue,
which has plagued patent adjudication since the beginning of time, is whether
patent rights are a private or a public right, and once determined, what agencies
have the power to grant or deny a patent to an inventor. And, although the
Supreme Court has declined to take on either of these cases, the two cases
provide pivotal insight to the regulatory patent scheme. More importantly,
these two cases illustrate the confusion in how the Supreme Court’s longstanding precedent related to agency actions will affect patents for both
invention and land.67
A. Cooper v. Lee
Recently, the petition for writ of certiorari in Cooper was denied by the
Supreme Court of the United States.68 There, the petitioner, J. Carl Cooper,
questioned whether 35 U.S.C. § 318(b) violates Article III of the United States
Constitution. Inter partes review proceeding established under that section of
the AIA grants broad authority to an executive agency tribunal to assert judicial
63. See Cooper v. Lee, 86 F. Supp. 3d 480 (E.D. Va. 2015), appeal transferred (Oct. 2, 2015),
aff’d (Jan. 14, 2016).
64. See 35 U.S.C. § 318.
65. See MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
66. Id. at 1285.
67. See, e.g., McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman-Miller Co., 169 U.S. 606 (1898).
68. See Cooper, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 480.
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power to cancel private property rights amongst private parties.69 J. Carl
Cooper’s argument rests on the sentiment that patent rights have always been
considered private rights and have been embroiled in a private federal dispute
of a type known in the common law courts of 1789, rather than merely issue an
advisory opinion as an adjunct to a trial court.70
The relevant procedural background in the case is as follows. J. Carl
Cooper is an inventor and owner of numerous patents.71 Cooper granted
eCharge Licensing, LLC an exclusive license to a number of his patents.72
eCharge sought a jury’s determination of infringement, validity, and damages
as to the three patents.73 In response, the defendant in that action petitioned the
PTAB to conduct an inter partes review of Mr. Cooper’s patents Nos.
6,764,005; 7,828,207; and 8,490,875.74 On May 15, 2014, the PTAB initiated
inter partes reviews of Cooper’s three patents.75 Rather than awaiting the
decision of the Board, Cooper filed a civil action in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, arguing that the inter partes review
proceedings are unconstitutional on several grounds.76 Moving for summary
judgment, Cooper relied on United States v. American Bell Telephone Co.,77
quoting the proposition that “[t]he power . . . to issue a patent for an invention,
and the authority to issue such an instrument for a grant of land, emanate from
the same source, and although exercised by differed bureau or officers under
the government, are of the same nature, character, and validity.”78 This
sentiment framed the theory for which Cooper proceeded—that patent rights
are private rights and thus, cannot be adjudicated by legislative courts and
administrative bodies without violating constitutional protections.79
Accordingly, Cooper makes the argument that “colloquially speaking, it has
never been the case that the PTO can rightfully ‘bring a patent into this world,’

69. Id.
70. Id. at 481.
71. Id.
72. Id. Petitioner J. Carl Cooper is an individual and owner of the relevant United Sates
patents, Petitioner eCharge LLC is an Illinois entity that helps inventors effectively license their
intellectual property.
73. Id. at 481.
74. eCharge Licensing LLC v. Square, Inc., Case No. 1:13-cv-06445 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
75. See id.
76. Dennis Crouch, Constitutional Challenges to IPR Continue, PATENTLYO (July 3, 2015),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/07/constitutional-challenges-continue.html [https://perma.cc/L778UBSA].
77. United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888).
78. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Cooper v.
Lee, No. 1:14-cv-00672 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2014) (Dkt. No. 4) (quoting Am. Bell, 128 U.S. at 358–59).
79. Id.
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and then later ‘take it out.’”80 The district court denied Cooper’s motion finding
that Cooper’s claims fail relying on the statutory scheme for administrative
review established in Patlex and Joy.81 The district court also denied Cooper’s
motion on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction as Cooper had not exhausted
the administrative process before raising an external constitutional challenge.82
Specifically, Congress intended the exhaustion doctrine to apply to inter partes
review because
(1) the express language of the AIA; (2) the procedures for inter partes
review proceedings defined by Congress and the statutory scheme for
administrative and judicial review of said proceedings; and (3) the AIA
expressly permitting judicial review of the PTAB’s decisions only once
the PTAB’s ‘final written decision’ has issued.83
Cooper appealed the lower court’s decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.84 After briefing, the Fourth Circuit transferred
the case to the Federal Circuit. Subsequently, the Federal Circuit stayed the
appeal pending the outcome of MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co.
B. HP Decision from Federal Circuit
The companion case to Cooper, MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard
Co., again raises important questions regarding the constitutionality of PTAB
proceedings under Article III and the Seventh Amendment. In this case, MCM
is the owner of U.S. patent No. 7,162,549 (549 patent), which claims methods
and systems for coupling computer systems with a flash memory storage
system.85 Hewlett-Packard Co. (HP) filed a petition with the USPTO
requesting inter partes review of the several claims of the 549 patent under
Section 311 asserting that the claims were obvious.86 In response, MCM argued
that inter partes proceedings should have never been conducted because it was
barred for privacy reasons under section 315(b).87 The PTAB determined that
HP’s petition demonstrated a “reasonable likelihood” that the challenged

80. Id.
81. Cooper v. Lee, 86 F. Supp. 3d 480, 483 (E.D. Va. 2015)
82. Id. See Cooper v. Lee, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19419, Case No. 1:14-cv-00672-GBL-JFA,
(E.D. Va. Feb. 18, 2015).
83. Cooper, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 480, 485; See 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (2012).
84. Id. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Cooper, No. 15-955.
85. MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
86. Id. at 1287.
87. Id. See also 35 U.S.C. §315(b).
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claims in the 549 patent were invalid as to obviousness.88 After a trial, the
PTAB issued a final written decision that the challenged claims would have
been obvious because HP showed by a preponderance of the evidence that the
claims were obvious, and in doing so, the PTAB rejected MCM’s argument that
IPR review violated Article III and MCM’s Seventh Amendment rights.89 On
appeal, MCM challenged the institution of IPR on two constitutional grounds.
First, MCM argued that inter partes review is unconstitutional because any
action revoking a patent must be tried in an Article III court with the protections
of the Seventh Amendment.90 Second, MCM argues as well that it has a right
to a trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment, which is not satisfied by the
system of inter partes review. The Seventh Amendment provides that, “[i]n
suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”91 However, mirroring the
decision in Cooper,92 the appellate court rejected MCM’s claims “[b]ecause
patent rights are public rights, and their validity susceptible to review by an
administrative agency, the Seventh Amendment poses no barrier to agency
adjudication without a jury.”93 Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit’s decision in
MCM was contrary to Cooper’s wishes and the court upheld the
constitutionality of the IPR proceeding.94
Still, believing that his case was an ideal and necessary vehicle for
clarifying Article III jurisprudence, and fixing the damage to the patent system,
Cooper petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari to clarify the issue of the
constitutionality of IPR.95 However, the Court failed to accept and, in doing
so, failed to resolve the issue of whether patent protections are private or
publicly held rights.
Where do the Federal Circuit decisions leave inventors? As one commenter
notes, “the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that a patent is a pubic right rather than
a private right is at a minimum questionable.”96 Although the Supreme Court
denied certiorari to these two cases, the petitioners raise pertinent issues
regarding the current state of the patent scheme. Accordingly, the next section
88. MCM Portfolio LLC, 812 F.3d at 1287.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1288.
91. Id. at 1292; U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
92. Cooper v. Lee, 86 F. Supp. 3d 480, 483 (E.D. Va. 2015).
93. MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,, 812 F.3d 1284, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
94. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Cooper, No. 15-955.
95. Id. at 36.
96. Charles R. Macedo, David Goldberg & Robert J. Rando, NYIPLA Urges SCOTUS to
Clarify Constitutionality of PTAB Proceedings in MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
IPWATCHDOG (June 1, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/06/01/nyipla-urges-scotusconstitutionality-ptab/id=69641/.
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of this comment will discuss the petitioner’s arguments in Cooper and MCM.
This Comment will focus on Cooper’s argument that IPR violates the Seventh
Amendment because it contradicts the long-standing precedent holding that
patents are property rights and thus, afforded adjudication by a jury.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF INTER PARTES REVIEW
UNDER THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
This section directly addresses the key question raised in both Cooper and
MCM. Because a patent is private right rather than a public right, do inter
partes and post grant proceedings violate the Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial? This section first examines a patent as a private right is a property
claim that cannot be revoked without a jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment. This next section examines the second claim, that a patent is a
public right, and therefore, can be revoked based upon an administrative
adjudication.
A. Claim 1: A patent is a private right
The district court’s decision in Cooper and the Federal Circuit’s decision
in MCM, holding that patent rights are public rights, was unprecedented and
completely contradicted the long recognition of the Court’s constitutional
protections of patents as private rights, which reaches back to the early
American Republic.97 This claim is crucial in the analysis. First, Cooper
claimed that patents rights are private property rights, and therefore can only
be remedied by actions in a jury trial.98 Thus, allowing inter partes review as
a form of patent adjudication is in direct conflict with this right to a jury trial.
This was echoed in the MCM Portfolio case, where the petitioner argued that
“[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”99
1. Judges, Juries and the Seventh Amendment Rights of Inventors
The U.S. patent system has long depended on the decisions of lay judges
and juries in the adjudications of patent disputes.100 The AIA’s creation of inter
partes review consequently abolished the patent jury trials, and put the
adjudication process in the hands of an administrative agency. Cooper makes
97. See Brief of Professor Adam Mossoff as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Cooper
v. Lee, No. 15-955, 2016 WL 825985 (Feb. 29, 2016).
98. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at 12, Cooper v. Lee, No. 15-955, 2016 WL 355184
(Jan. 21, 2016).
99. MCM Portfolio LLC, 812 F.3d at 1292 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VII).
100. Daily & Kieff, supra note 47, at 865 (discussing the criticisms and benefits of adjudicating
patent disputes by patent juries).
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the argument that the patentee is deprived of the right of a jury trial because
inter partes review involves the adjudication of patent validity without
affording them a jury trial.101 However, critics of the patent jury trials allege
that trials are extraordinarily expensive and result in inaccurate determinations
because lay judges and juries lack expertise in the area.102 In deciding whether
a right to a jury trial exists in a particular patent case, courts look to whether it
more closely resembles an action at law, or action of equity.103 Patent
infringement suit have a long history in the common law, and thus, that of a
jury trial.104 The Court has adjudicated Patent Rights, and explained that
[a]lthough the thrust of the Amendment was to preserve the right to jury
trial as it existed in 1791, the Seventh Amendment also applies to
actions brought to enforce statutory rights that are analogous to
common-law causes of action ordinarily decided in English law courts
in the late 18th century, as opposed to those customarily heard by courts
of equity or admiralty.105
Thus, as the petitioners in MCM Portfolio urged, the determination of
whether a right is a private right afforded adjudication by a jury trial requires
that courts, “[f]irst compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought
in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity.
Second, we examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or
equitable in nature.”106 MCM argues that under this test, IPR indeed violate the
Seventh Amendment, because patents on inventions are descendants of a body
of law that requires factual determinations in order to determine validity.107
As the MCM petition states, the post grant proceedings conducted by the
PTAB are in reality a trial.108 Once the proceedings are initiated, the PTAB
101. Cooper v. Lee, 86 F. Supp. 3d 480, 481 (E.D. Va. 2015).
102. Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries and Patent Cases – An Empirical Peek inside the
Black Box, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 209, 256–57 (2001) (arguing that the technical nature of patent cases
make lay juries unsuitable fact finders).
103. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
104. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 377 (1996) (“Equally
familiar is the descent of today’s patent infringement action from the infringement actions tried at law
in the 18th century, and there is not dispute that infringement cases today must be tried to a jury, as
their predecessors were more than two centuries ago.”).
105. Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 41–42 (1989) (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189, 193 (1974)).
106. Tull, 481 U.S. 412, 417–18 (1987) (citations omitted).
107. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 992–93 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d,
517 U.S. 370 (1996).
108. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No.
15-1330, 2016 WL 1729988 (Apr. 29, 2016).
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conducts an adversarial trial before a panel of the same administrative judges
who made the decision to initiate the proceedings.109 Further, the parties in a
PTAB proceeding take discovery and then present their arguments and relevant
evidence, but instead of doing so to a judge or jury, they present to the PTAB.110
To succeed, the petitioner must only prove invalidity by a preponderance of
evidence, as the PTAB is the sole decision-making authority,111 and the final
determination is non-appealable.112 However, even though the PTAB
proceedings hold the exact same effect and pose the same procedure to
patentees, it provides none of the traditional rights to litigants.113 According to
a study in the University of Chicago Law Review, the PTAB has invalidated at
least one “claim”—or part—in almost 80% of the patents.114 As such, private
patent rights are denied at a much higher rate, leading some commenters to use
the term “patent death squad” when referring to the PTAB.115
The MCM petition stated the issue most clearly, citing to Supreme Court
precedent that “[t]he only authority competent to set a patent aside, or to annul
it, or to correct it for any reason whatsoever, is vested in the courts of the United
States, and not the department which issued the patent.”116 Further, Adam
Mosshoff argued in his amicus brief that “[t]his Court unequivocally defined
patents as property rights in the early American Republic.”117 As evidence of
this assertion, Mosshoff quoted a unanimous Supreme Court opinion written by
Justice Joseph Story stating, “that the patent secures to an inventor . . . a
property in his inventions; a property which is of very great value, and of which
the law intended to give him absolute enjoyment and possession.”118 It seems
109. Id. at 4.
110. Id. at 5.
111. Id.
112. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012). Section 314(d) provides that “[t]he determination . . .
whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and non-appealable.”
113. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 377 (1996).
114. Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the Numbers.
81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93 (2014).
115. Ryan Davis, PTAB’s ‘Death Squad’ Label Not Totally Off-Base, Chief Says, LAW 360
(Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/567550/ptab-s-death-squad-label-not-totally-offbase-chief-says [https://perma.cc/7W7B-92AQ].
116. McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman-Miller Co., 169 U.S. 606, 609 (1898).; see
also Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. at 364. (Holding that the power to annul or correct a patent “is vested
in the judicial department of the government, and this can only be effected by proper proceedings taken
in the courts of the United States.”).
117. McCormick, 169 U.S. at 609 (1898).
118. Brief of Professor Adam Mossoff as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note
97, at 4 (quoting Ex Parte Wood, 22 (9. Wheat) 603, 608 (1824); See also Hayden v. Suffolk Mfg. Co.,
11 F. Cas. 900, 901 (C.C.D. Mass. 1862) (No. 6,261) (instructing jury that a patent right, gentlemen,
is a right given to a man by a law where he has a valid patent, and, as a legal right, is just as scared as
any right of property.).
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that the Supreme Court and legal scholars have agreed that patent rights are
property rights afforded to private citizens, so where does the conflict arise?
B. Claim 2: A patent right is a public right.
It is also easy to see the other side of the argument, which stresses that
allowing patent jury trials pre-AIA clogged the court with litigation, and put
information in front of a lay jury that may have a hard time digesting it.119 As
the Court in Patlex and Joy concluded, patent rights are public rights and
subject to regulation by the government. Further, just as the district court in
Cooper and the appellate court in MCM decided, Congress has long provided
administrative mechanisms for regulation of the patent scheme.120 The patent
bargain also plays a big role in the respondent’s argument. The respondent rests
its case on the fundamental purpose of patent law. The basic aim of patent law
is to balance the interest of investors on one hand and the interest of the public
on the other.121 Thus, to incentivize inventors, the patent system must reward
them for novel works of original art, and not create an unduly burdensome
process of examining and reexamining claims.
This Court previously addressed the idea of patents as a public right.122 In
doing so, it determined that “what makes a right public rather than private rests
on whether that right is related to a ‘particular federal action.”123 Moreover, the
respondent suggests that the petitioners, specifically Adam Mossoff’s amici
curiae, ignores the Supreme Court’s modern holdings and rely on dated case
law, many of which comes from the nineteenth century.124 Also, the respondent
claims that the petitioner’s argument lacks merit because the cases they rely on
involve patents for land and were all decided on statutory rather than
constitutional grounds.125 This is the respondent’s strongest argument against
the unconstitutionality of the IPR proceedings. As such, it could be inferred
that the history of patent law transformed to fit the needs of society. The Patent
Act of 1952 provides support for that idea. Under the Patent Act of 1952,
Congress provided for administrative mechanisms for third parties seeking
119. William Rose, Calming Unsettled Waters: A Proposal for Navigating the Tenuous Power
Divide Between the Federal Courts and the USPTO Under the American Invents Act, 22 WM. & MARY
BILL OF RTS. J. 613, 632–37 (2013).
120. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition of Writ of Certiorari, Cooper v. Lee, Cooper v.
Lee, No.15-955, 2016 WL 1426908.
121. Purpose of Patent Law, RENTSCH PARTNER, http://www.rentschpartner.ch/en/patentlaw/overview-on-patent-law-in-switzerland/purpose-of-patent-law [https://perma.cc/7YQZ-ZHCQ]
(last visited Jan. 20 2017).
122. See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483–85 (2011).
123. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
124. Brief for Respondent in Opposition of Writ of Certiorari, supra note 120, at 14.
125. Id.
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reconsideration, and in doing so created ex parte reexamination.126 This statute
broadened the USPTO’s power over the ability to cancel or at least halt
patentability.127 Again, in 1999, Congress expanded the powers of the USPTO
to review and determine the patentability of claims in issued patents by creating
the inter partes review process.128 Finally, in 2011, under the AIA, Congress
expanded the powers of the USPTO to establish their own board of adjudicating
authority. This is said to be a response to “a growing sense that questionable
patents are too easily obtained and are too difficult to challenge.”129
The petitioners in Cooper and MCM maintained to the Supreme Court that
their cases were an ideal vehicle for clarifying Article III jurisprudence and
fixing constitutional damage to the patent system. However, in opposition to
the sentiment that the PTAB violated Seventh Amendment protections, it is a
commonly held and economically practical idea that patent trials are costly and
produced inaccurate decisions. This idea is reflected in the statement during a
judicial panel discussion on the topic of science and the law, “[h]onest to God,
I don’t see how you could try patent matter to a jury. Goodness, I’ve gotten
involved in a few of these things. It’s like somebody hit you between your eyes
with a four-by-four. It’s factually so complicated.”130 Ultimately, the Court was
unpersuaded. The Supreme Court declined the petitions, and, in doing so, failed
to clarify whether patent rights are property rights or public rights, and further
clarify the PTAB’s carte blanche authority over inventors. Failure to take up
the issues has created a contradiction in nexus between patent law and
constitutional law. Where do inventors go from here? And, will the Supreme
Court’s failure to clarify the issues stop subsequent litigation? The latter is
unlikely.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
There are several avenues the patent scheme may proceed. First, the Court
could and will likely experience more litigation regarding the adjudication of
patent rights. Accordingly, the Court could determine that patent rights are
private rights and thus afforded adjudication by trial with a jury. However, this
may not fix the problems of the patent regulatory scheme. Second, the Court
could decide that patent rights are public rights, and that Congress’s grant of
broad authority to the PTAB is not a constitutional violation. However, this

126. Cooper v. Lee, 86 F. Supp. 3d 480, 483 (E.D. Va. 2015).
127. Id.
128. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition of Writ of Certiorari, supra note 120, at 2.
129. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 39 (2011).
130. Symposium, Judicial Panel Discussion on Science and the Law, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1127,
1144 (1993).
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will stop the challenges from petitioners like Cooper or MCM Portfolio, nor
does it clear up historical precedent and statutory transitions.
Patent academic Ray Mercado filed an amicus brief, in a final effort to
persuade the Court that patents should be seen as “private rights,” not a public
utility that can merely be administratively cancelled. He writes, “[o]nce the
historical uniqueness of patent law is taken into account, it is clear that patents
are ‘private rights’ for purposes of this Court’s separation of powers
jurisprudence, and their validity must be decided by Article III courts.”131
The best practice would be for the Court to clarify whether a patent right is
a public or private right and to make sure all lower courts are on the same page.
This would include possibly holding a judicial council on the issue at bar, and
potentially reworking the patent system to allow for more adjudicating options
for those inventors who wish to make their case to a jury. Moreover, it seems
from the previous amendments that the legislature is unsure how to responds to
issue arising under the patent scheme. It seems that some patents should be
able to go forward with the PTAB proceedings and some should be afforded
Seventh Amendment protections. But these proceedings require factual
determination, and a patent jury, in some instances, could be pooled by
screening individuals with a background in patent law and/or inventors in the
field. Congress should also provide an avenue for appeal from the PTAB’s
final written decision without facing dismissal under the administrative
exhaustion doctrine.
CONCLUSION
According to a White House press release, the AIA “represents the most
significant reform of the Patent Act since 1952,” and inter partes review and
post-grant proceedings are key sections of the Act.132 However, there are clear
issues with the proceedings, and ignoring these issues by denying certiorari will
not make them go away. The Supreme Court must clarify the issues plaguing
the patent system and causing discomfort for inventors who want their piece of
the patent bargain. “The very fact that the lower court believed itself to be
faithfully applying this Court’s latest ‘public rights’ pronouncements indicates
how deeply this area of law is in disrepair and how desperately necessary

131. Dennis Crouch, One Last Try: Is the Inter Partes Review System Unconstitutional,
PATENTLYO (Oct. 19, 2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/10/review-system-unconstitutional.
html [https://perma.cc/FP6G-7GSU].
132. See The White House, Press Release, President Obama Signs America Invents Act,
Overhauling the Patent System to Stimulate Economic Growth, and Announces New Steps to Help
Entrepreneurs Create Jobs (Sept. 16, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16
/president-obama-signs-america-invents-act-overhauling-patent-system-stim.
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Supreme Court elucidation is on this important issue.”133 The broad lesson to
be drawn from this comment is that no legislation is cost-free. Although the
benefits of inter partes review may seem high because the proceedings are
conducted by the PTAB, a body that is skilled in the patent and invention
process, it is also important to weigh those benefits against their true cost.134
As the use of inter partes review in post-grant proceedings is becoming a
common process for establishing validity of patent claims, patentees are
employing a large range of legal arguments against the PTAB’s authority to
invalidate their patents. However, these arguments are made without solid
solutions to the problem. Even if the PTAB’s authority to invalidate patents is
ultimately affirmed, future appeals are likely to raise new constitutional
arguments, such as Fifth Amendment due process concerns.135 The
dissatisfaction with the PTAB’s most decisions most invalidating patents has
placed the issue of constitutionality directly in the cross hairs of the Federal
Circuit. Absent clarification on this issue, almost nothing remains of the high
walls this courts has occasionally had to invoke to prevent Congressional
encroachment on the judicial branch.
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133. Greenspoon, supra note 19.
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